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$43.00 (hardback). 
 
The history of rhetorical argumentation is a much neglected and 
abused area of study.  In modern academic parlance, ‘rhetoric’ is often 
associated with nefarious motives and intentional misrepresentations 
of evidence.  However, this perception masks a tremendously 
influential tradition that began in classical times and still continues to 
be influential today (particularly in the field of law).   Building on the 
works of classical authors, rhetoric was an integral subject of the 
medieval trivium.  As has been convincingly shown by Brian Vickers’ 
In Defence of Rhetoric (1988), Anthony Grafton’s Defenders of the 
Text (1991) and Quentin Skinner’s Reason and Rhetoric in the 
Philosophy of Hobbes (1996), Renaissance and Early Modern 
intellectuals recalibrated the medieval conception of rhetoric (mainly 
by ignoring the Scholastic adherence to Aristotle’s Treatise on 
Rhetoric) and revived the works of ancient orators like Cicero and 
Quintillion.  In some cases, rhetorical modes of arrangement affected 
axiomatic reason and taxonomies of natural history; a situation that has 
been investigated in Paolo Rossi’s Francis Bacon: From Magic to 
Science (1966) and Ann Blair’s The Theater of Nature (1997). 
It is precisely this tradition of scholarship that Locke’s Essay and 
the Rhetoric of Science seems to have missed.  Instead, its presentation 
of rhetoric is more influenced by definitions set forth by several 
canonical works in sociology of scientific knowledge, especially 
Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump 
(1985) and Steven Shapin’s A Social History of Truth (1994).  Yet 
even these authors at least acknowledge the influence of classical 
rhetoric.  Despite this link, Walmsley misses the woods for the trees by 
honing in on diffidentism, metaphorical language, analogical 
ambiguities and simplistic narratives. In reality these stylistic practices 
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were merely tools used within the three larger genres of composition 
(judicial, deliberative and epideictic) that remained unaddressed in 
Locke’s Essay.  Nor do we hear about the five elements of rhetorical 
arrangement (inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria and pronuntiatio) 
and or its six different formats (exordium, narratio, partitio, 
confirmatio, refutatio and conclusio).  Granted, these categories were 
employed differently throughout Europe at this time, but they were 
most definitely used on a frequent basis.  It therefore seems quite odd 
that the presence of such a strong tradition is not even mentioned in a 
book interested in the rhetorical foundations of Locke’s Essay.   
Throughout the book, Walmsley also avers that analogy and 
metaphor are compositional tools that are inherently rhetorical.  This is 
a bit perplexing, since Locke and other authors of the early modern 
period were quite interested in using analogies and metaphors that did 
not appeal to the emotions.  This is why Locke’s understanding of 
metaphor was linked to larger problems associated with the ambiguous 
and flippant use of language.  As E. J. Lowe has shown in Locke on 
Human Understanding (1995), Locke’s thoughts on language were 
often guided by his interest in the interaction between words, ideas and 
signs.  Yet when treating Locke’s use of metaphor, Walmsley does not 
address these crucial concerns.  Nor does he touch on how the 
synonymical and metonymical aspects of Locke’s writings governed 
the Essay’s use of words that today would be understood as metaphors.   
Locke’s Essay’s treatment of ‘analogical induction’ is also puzzling.  
Walmsley’s use of this term suggests that Locke felt both analogy and 
induction were somehow inextricably linked under a larger rhetorical 
rubric.  However, this picture does not square with Locke’s own use of 
the terms throughout the Essay, or with their use by those who 
subscribed to the New Philosophy promoted by Robert Boyle, Isaac 
Newton and other members of the Royal Society of London.  This 
point was addressed several years back in Lorraine Daston’s Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment (1988).  She showed that Newton and 
several of his followers defined the terms in the following manner: 
‘Induction progressed horizontally, by collecting instances of the same 
type into eventual generalization; analogy worked vertically, 
extrapolating the results of inductions at one level to the unobserved 
phenomena at another’ (p. 244).  The work of Daston and other 
scholars on this subject suggests that Walmsley’s portrayal of Locke’s 
analogical induction does not fit with what is known about his 
contemporaries.   
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On the whole, Locke’s Essay is pleasantly written and will be 
interesting to those who are unfamiliar with the history of science.  It 
has a good number of illustrations and one of its main subtexts is that 
Locke was a keen natural historian whose methods of collecting data 
mirrored those of Robert Boyle.  Walmsley also makes some 
perceptive points on the process by which examples taken from the 
natural world served to strengthen the plausibility of seventeenth-
century philosophical arguments.  Yet for those more familiar with the 
empirical epistemology that undergirded Enlightenment conceptions of 
evidence and experimentation, this book will only reconfirm other 
research that has already been done in the field. 
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